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lt's regrettable that neither Hannah Arendt nor Jean-Paul Sartre attended 
seriously to the ideas of the other. For of all the thinkers within the phenomenological 
tradition they are surely the two with the most profound passion for politics; and they 
are two who developed the most sustained reflections on the world of politics. They are 
also both, par excellence, philosophers of action. They both investigate the conditions 
for free and meaningful action, and they seek to understand why it is so elusive in the 
modern world. Thus, in spite of their lack of interest in each other's works, I have 
chosen in this paper to engage them in what I hope will be a productive encounter with 
each other. In particular, I propose to explore what we might learn from such an 
encounter about the significance - and the difficulties --- of forms of direct political 
participation. For a growing body of recent work in political theory and philosophy 
criticizes extant forms of representative government, and extols the virtues of direct 
citizen participation. 1 
***** 
Both Arendt's The Human Condition [1958] and Sartre 's Critique of Dialectical 
Reason [ 1960] offer extended meditations on the relationship of freedom to necessity, 
and both thinkers affirm, each in her or his own way, the persistence of human freedom 
even in what Arendt calls „dark times. "2 Furthermore, they both share the fundamental 
insight, that human activities are mediated by the world of material things, a world 
which we ourselves create from the resources of nature, through a multitude of 
1 Some of the more recent advocates of more participatory politics include: Carol Gould, Rethinking 
Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988; Ben Barber, Strang Democracy, Berkeley, CA: 
University of Califomia Press, 1984; Jeffrey Isaac, Democracy in Dark Times, Ithaca, NY: Comell 
University Press, 1998; Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen, Civil Society and Political Theory, Cambridge, MA, 
MIT Press, 1992; Iris Young, Jnclusion and Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
2 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958. Cited in the text 
hereafter as HC; Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith, London: 
New Left Books, 1976 (French original, Critique de la raison dialectique, Paris: Gallimard, 1969). Cited in 
the text hereafter as CDR. 
108 Sonia KRUKS 
practices. However, for the later Sartre, such mediations lead generally to a loss of 
freedom, while for Arendt they enable free action to take place. „Reification," that is, 
the materialization of human activity in tangible objects, represents for Sartre (like 
Marx) an alienation of our activity, but for Arendt its positive expression (HC 139-40). 
There is, for Sartre, a „primitive type of alienation" of praxis, which is logically 
prior to the more complex forms of alienation that arise from such social relations as 
class conflict (CDR 124). For Sartre, the objects we create through praxis act back 
against us coercively. What he calls "practico-inert" entities produce in us their own 
demands. They drain our freedom from us as they coerce our future activities. 
Whenever we act, we interiorize the inertness of worked matter as our own. For 
example, for a house to remain habitable and meet our need for shelter, we must 
endlessly meet its demands. lt must be „heated, swept, repainted, etc; otherwise it 
deteriorates. This vampire object [my emphasis] constantly absorbs human 
action"(CDR 169). 
By contrast, although it can be made to encroach on our freedom, Arendt sees 
the world of material things that we create as fundamentally benign and supportive. 
Indeed, it is what makes a truly human life possible. She observes: "To live together in 
the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in 
common, as a table is located between those who sit around it" (HC 42); and elsewhere 
she remarks: „without being at home in the midst of things whose durability makes 
them fit for use, and for erecting a world whose very permanence stands in direct 
contrast to life, this life would never be human" (HC 134-5). 
Thus, materiality is not only a quality of tangible things but, for both thinkers, 
also bears crucially on social relations. For Sartre, the human relations (the „social 
ensembles" as he calls them) that arise from our multiple praxes are most often 
negatively mediated by materiality. And they are shaped not only by the "primitive 
alienation" that arises from worked matter but also by the fact that - at least in our 
history so far - we always act within a material field of scarcity. Within this field, we 
encounter the praxis of others above all as the alteration of our own - as draining away 
our freedom. Consequently, human bonds generally become forms of what Sartre calls 
"antagonistic reciprocfty": as conscious subjects we reciprocally experience each other 
as threat. We are for each other a "demonic double"(CDR 132). Bach is - and 
recognizes her/himself to be - altered by others and to alter them, in the indefinite 
chain of alienating relationships that Sartre calls "seriality." For Arendt, on the 
contrary, although it may become distorted, our sociality is the very condition of 
freedom, that is of action. „Action is never possible in isolation ... Action and speech 
are surrounded by and in constant contact with the web of acts and words of other 
men"(HC 188). Indeed, it is such socially embedded action that is the source of the 
highest pleasures and most meaningful aspects of human existence. 
In The Human Condition Arendt is at pains to distinguish several different kinds 
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of activity which Sartre ( equally deliberately) groups together under the single term, 
''praxis." For Sartre, praxis consists in all and any intentional human activity. However 
constrained and alienated, we may still say that praxis is „free," in that it is not 
determined but rather, „creates its own law" as „a mediation between the given, past 
objectivity and the [new] objectification which is tobe produced" (CDR 549). But for 
Arendt, it is important sharply to differentiate the three domains of human activity that 
she calls, respectively, „labor," „work," and „action"; and it is central to her critique of 
Marx ( and by implication of a thinker such as Sartre) that he elides them. 
For Arendt, „action" has a particular quality -- freedom -- which labor and work 
both lack. Labor, Arendt argues, is concerned with the immediate reproduction of 
human life, the realm of pure necessity, and it produces the things needed for instant 
consumption in an endless cyclicity. She distinguishes work, both phenomenologically 
and functionally, from labor, for it involves the skilled fabrication of those durable 
objects that are necessary for the stability and endurance of the human world. But while 
both labor and work are necessary dimensions of human existence and each may be, in 
its own way, meaningful to its doer, neither is the site of freedom. Only what Arendt 
calls action is, she insists, a wholly free undertaking -- and she argues that key to its 
freedom is that (unlike labor and work) it is independent of materiality, and so of 
necessity. Thus, she asserts, "action . . . . goes on directly between men without the 
intermediary of things or matter."(HC 7; my emphases). 
For Arendt, the necessary site of action is public political space. lt is here that 
the self may bring itself into being as it discloses itself before others. „In acting and 
speaking, men show who they · are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and 
thus make their appearance in the human world . . . this revelatory quality of speech 
and action comes to the fore when people are with others and neither for nor against 
them -- that is in sheer human togetherness" (HC 179-80; emphases added). For 
Arendt, politics at its best, ( as in the participatory politics of the Greek polis) is par 
excellence the domain of freedom: that is, it is the domain of self-creating action 
unbound by necessity and materiality. 
But Sartre's account of praxis in the Critique puts into question Arendt's claims 
that action is so radically different from labor and work. For Sartre demonstrates that 
all human praxis takes place somewhere along a continuum of degrees of freedom and 
of its alienation ( or alteration) through its practico-inert mediations. Thus, he argues, 
even the most coerced labor does not constitute a total annihilation of human freedom. 
Conversely, even the most free action, (that of the spontaneous coming-together and 
cooperation of what he calls the "group-in-fusion"), is still conditioned by the 
exigencies of worked matter. In his extended example of a group-in-fusion, the group 
which stormed the Bastille during the French Revolution, Sartre shows how the layout 
of the city, the physical form of the Bastille itself, the kind of weapons available, etc„ 
as well as the threat from the surrounding soldiers, all re-entered, constrained, and 
110 Sonia KRUKS 
altered "free" praxis. 
Through a multiplicity of examples and historical cases, Sartre show us why 
Arendt's insistence that „action . . . goes on directly between men without the 
intermediary of things or matter" (HC 7; emphases added) is problematic. Thus, as I 
show next, he better enables us to account for the always temporary nature of those 
„spaces of freedom," of those spaces of direct political "action," which, in On 
Revolution, Arendt refers to as the "council system." 
***** 
In On Revolution [ 1963 ]3 Arendt interprets modern European and American 
history through the lenses she had developed in The Human Condition. What Arendt 
celebrates, above all, is the spontaneous emergence of those „spaces of freedom" where 
„action" may take place. In the fevered constitution-writing and the intense early town 
meetings of America, and in the neighborhood organizations and political clubs of 
Paris, politics as free action emerged. Here were forms of politics in which citizens 
participated directly, and where they did not abnegate their freedom to so-called 
representatives. Here, the very process of political participation involved the 
meaningful self-creation and disclosure of seif to others that Arendt calls freedom. 
In the final chapter, entitled „The Revolutionary Tradition and Its Lost 
Treasures," Arendt notes and celebrates the fact that similar spaces of freedom, what 
she refers to as the instances of the "council system," have repeatedly continued to 
erupt across history. They sprung up in the Paris Commune of 1871, in self-creating 
soviets in Russia in 1905 and 19I7, in neighborhood councils and student groups in 
Hungary in 1956, and she -- rightly -- anticipates they will continue to do so. What 
Arendt values in the council system is the spontaneous emergence of forms of face-to-
face deliberation and decision making that others have called direct, or participatory, 
democracy. Councils are, she says, what „we could also call spaces of appearance"(OR 
275). They are spaces for self-creating and self-disclosing action among equals of the 
kind that Arendt believes makes us most human. These spaces are the instantiation of 
what (in The Human Condition) she had called „sheer human togetherness" (HC 179-
80). 
But, in none of the great revolutions did freedom last. Instead, „necessity," 
recolonized the spaces of freedom. This happened, Arendt explains, through failures of 
leadership and, above all, through the use of the political arena to pursue inappropriate 
„social" ends -- to protect wealth, or to end poverty. In the case of America, it lead to 
3 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, New York: Viking Penguin, 1963. Cited in the text hereafter as OR. 
Materiality and the Limits to Free Political Action: Sartre and Arendt 111 
the pursuit of private happiness, the emergence of party politics, and corruption; in the 
cases of France and Russia, to Terror. For, as sites of continuous action, the councils 
also threatened the revolutionary movements from which they were spawned. This is 
because „the revolutionary spirit was not merely the spirit of beginning something new 
but of starting something permanent and enduring ... From which it unfortunately [ my 
emphasis] seems to follow that nothing threatens the achievements of revolutions more 
dangerously and more acutely than the spirit which has brought them about"(OR 232). 
„Unfortunate," indeed. But it is surely not merely a matter of bad fortune, or 
chance. Arendt offers a series of ad hominem explanations for the failure of revolutions 
to sustain free action. She blames such great revolutionary leaders as Jefferson, 
Robespierre, Marx and Lenin for a lack of vision. They all failed to envision and foster 
the appropriate institutional forms for the perpetuation of "action," she claims; and so 
they brought about the loss of the greatest "treasures" of the revolutionary tradition. 
Beyond such ad hominem explanations, Arendt attributes the lamentable, but 
apparently inevitable, destruction of spaces of freedom to the domination of revolutions 
by what she calls „the social question," or by „necessity." In every case the alleviation 
of want, or demands to address material needs and interests, have displaced the pursuit 
of freedom as a good. This displacement seems to be inevitable, she implies, since the 
poor cannot but be concerned about material questions. Yet, for Arendt (unlike Sartre) 
need is still is presented as an unfortunate side-issue, one that causes revolutions to 
deviate from their "proper" purpose. But, as Sartre so clearly demonstrates in the 
Critique, need is not a side-issue, and freedom never escapes the exigencies of material 
existence. lt here that Sartre's analyses may take us beyond Arendt's. 
Sartre shares with Arendt not only the valuation of human freedom as a supreme 
good, but also her distrust of centralized and bureaucratized political institutions. He 
shares, moreover, her appreciation of direct political participation as providing spaces 
for human freedom. In his paradigmatic account of such participation, the group-in-
fusion that storms the Bastille, all initially find their own praxis returned to them 
augmented. Their freedom is now affirmed, and not negated, in their common project. 
But the group-in-fusion is only possible within and, in that sense, still is conditioned by 
a particular material field. Thus, if it is to endure beyond the initial moment of fusion it 
cannot avoid re-interiorizing its exigencies. Once it has stormed the Bastille the group 
discovers that, if it to survive, it must divide up the tasks of manning the weapons, 
must organize look-outs, arrange supplies of food from outside, and so on. Moreover, 
the group has also to police itself, to ensure that each performs their assigned task, and 
that none defects. lt is with these last exigencies that violence, or the threat of violence, 
reenters the group. All institutions that endure, from clubs to the state, must exert 
coercive tendencies back against their members, Sartre argues. 
Similar tendencies, of course, exist in the spaces of freedom which Arendt 
considers, as well as in more contemporary spaces of direct political participation. 
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Whether the event 1s storming the Bastille or forming an anti-war demonstration, 
occupying a factory, forming a worker's committee, calling a town meeting, organizing 
a boycott, occupying a polluting power-station, or participating in a consciousness-
raising group, the same question is posed: why cannot the group endure as an (as it 
were) "uncontaminated" site for free political action? Sartre 's analyses of the 
repenetration of the group by the exigencies of the practico-inert does much to explain 
why Arendt's vision, of free political action as wholly unmediated by material 
necessity, is misguided; and why she is unable adequately to analyze the failures she 
laments. Contra Arendt, he shows us why action cannot take place "without the 
intermediary of things or matter" (HC 7). 
**** 
Sartre's analysis is profoundly sobering. Of course, even the most committed 
advocates of direct, participatory politics realize that there are enormous "external" 
obstacles to its instantiation. These include the over-bearing power of the state, and of 
other great organs of massification, such as the market economy and the media. Like 
Arendt, they may also consider the problems of unimaginative leadership, or the 
corrupting effects of personal self-interest or greed. But Sartre tells us that there is 
more: there is also a logic "internal" to collective action itself, one that must 
reintroduce seriality and reification into groups that survive more than momentarily. 
But although Sartre demonstrates why free political action may never transcend 
its material mediations, and although he explains why the reintroduction of inertia and 
seriality back into group actions are unavoidable, still we do not have to take from his 
account a wholly pessimistic reading of the possibility of freedom in the world. Indeed 
-- and this is the final moment of the encounter between Sartre and Arendt that I have 
been staging -- Arendt (briefly and in passing) perhaps suggests why. Near the end of 
On Revolution she suggest that "councils" (that is, the spaces of direct, face-to-face 
action) may be "the best instruments, for example, for breaking up the modern mass 
society, with its dangerous tendency toward the formation of pseudo-political mass 
movements"(OR 279). One may read Arendt here as saying, like Sartre, that we should 
not hope to "achieve" or to "arrive at" a permanent condition of direct participation. 
For it cannot be stably institutionalized. Instead, we should acknowledge that direct 
participation is by its nature necessarily episodic: particular instances will either 
dissolve or undergo reification. Collectively, however, as they come and go they do 
constitute an ongoing force of contestation. At their best, and indeed precisely because 
they are intrinsically so fleeting, they may keep open possibilities for freedom --
perhaps even in our own "dark times." 
